Hofstra Law Review
Volume 6 | Issue 4

Article 8

1978

Moore v. City of East Cleveland
Kathe J. Tyrrell

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr
Recommended Citation
Tyrrell, Kathe J. (1978) "Moore v. City of East Cleveland," Hofstra Law Review: Vol. 6: Iss. 4, Article 8.
Available at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol6/iss4/8

This document is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hofstra Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. For more information, please contact lawcls@hofstra.edu.

Tyrrell: Moore v. City of East Cleveland

COMMENTS
MOORE V. CITY OF EAST CLEVELAND

ZONINc-Due Process and Restrictive Definitions of "Family"-A
municipal ordinance limiting residential occupancy to a restricted
family unit comprised of certain categories of related individuals
violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 97 S.

Ct. 1932 (1977).
In May 1977, the Supreme Court decided Moore v. City of
East Cleveland,' invalidating an Ohio zoning ordinance which limited occupancy of residential housing to members of a restricted
family unit. 2 The Moore decision, symptomatic of the judicial
schizophrenia surrounding this issue, fractured the nine-member
1. 97 S. Ct. 1932 (1977).
2. Section 1351.02 of the Codified Ordinances of the City of East Cleveland,
Ohio restricted occupancy of a dwelling unit to one "family." Section 1341.08 defined the term "family" as used in the ordinance:
1341.08 FAMILY.
'Family' means a number of individuals related to the nominal head of the
household or to the spouse of the nominal head of the household living as a
single housekeeping unit in a single dwelling unit, but limited to the following:

(a) husband or wife of the nominal head of the household.
(b) unmarried children of the nominal head of the household or of the
spouse of the nominal head of the household, provided, however, that such
unmarried children have no children residing with them.
(c) father or mother of the nominal head of the household or of the
spouse of the nominal head of the household.
(d) notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, a family may
include not more than one dependent married or unmarried child of the
nominal head of the household or of the spouse of the nominal head of the
household and the spouse and dependent children of such dependent child.
For the purpose of this subsection, a dependent person is one who has more
than fifty percent of his total support furnished for him by the nominal head
of the household and the spouse of the nominal head of the household.
(e) a family may consist of one individual.
EAST CLEVELAND, OHIO MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES § 1341.08 (1966), reprinted in

Brief for the Appellant at 2-3, Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 97 S. Ct. 1932 (1977).
Section 1351.02 limited occupancy as follows: "1351.02 LIMITATION ON OCCUPANCY. The occupancy of any dwelling unit shall be limited to one, and only one,
family and to any authorized persons occupying such dwelling unit with such family." Id. § 1351.02, Brief for the Appellant at 3.
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Court: Six separate opinions were published. 3 The extent to which
personal lifestyle choices may be regulated through zoning restriction has remained elusive in recent years. The relative paucity of
zoning challenges to reach the Supreme Court has rendered
"case-by-case development of constitutional limits
on zoning
power"4 impossible. In his concurrence in Moore, Justice Stevens
noted: "With one minor exception, between the Nectow [v. City of
Cambridge] decision in 1928 and the 1972 decision in Village of
Belle Terre v. Boraas, this Court did not review the substance of
any zoning ordinances." 5 Indeed, the Supreme Court examined the
constitutionality of zoning restrictions on who may lawfully reside
together only once prior to Moore. 6 Constitutional challenges based
on the equal protection clause 7 and on the fundamental rights of
privacy and association were rejected in Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas by a majority opinion joined by seven members of the
Court. 8 In the short line of zoning decisions, the full import of
Moore is yet to be determined. To the extent that Moore may be
viewed as a legal barometer of the times, the Court appears to be
moving, however haltingly, toward greater recognition of a limited
right to choice of lifestyle. The position of the appellees in Village
of Belle Terre v. Boraas,9 which the Court rejected in that case,
"that social homogeneity is not a legitimate interest of the government.

.

. [but] is antithetical to the Nation's experience, ideology,

and self-perception as an open, egalitarian, and integrated society," 10 may now have captured the attention of the Court. 11

3. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun. Justice Brennan also wrote a separate concurrence,
joined by Justice Marshall. A separate concurring opinion was written by Justice
Stevens. Chief Justice Burger, Justice White, and Justice Stewart joined by Justice
Rehnquist wrote separate dissents.
4. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1944 (1977) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
5. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). See also
Johnson, ConstitutionalLaw and Community Planning, 20 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
199 (1955), citing 21 cases involving local ordinances or action by local officials denied review by the Supreme Court during the six terms between 1949-1950 and 1954-

1955. Id. at 208.
6. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
8. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7 (1974).
9. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
10. Id. at 7.
11. See text accompanying notes 69-76 infra.
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THE PRE-Moore DECISIONS
Although the Supreme Court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co.12 firmly established the validity of zoning procedures
under state police power, 13 it was not until Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas14 that the constitutionality of restricting one's choice of
household companions first arose. 15 The Belle Terre ordinance restricted land use solely to one-family dwellings. "Family" was defined as:
One or more persons related by blood, adoption, or marriage
living and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit, exclusive of household servants. A number of persons but not exceeding two (2) living and cooking together as a single housekeeping
unit though not related by blood, adoption, or marriage shall be
deemed to constitute a family.16
Six college students, unrelated by "blood, adoption, or marriage,"
leased a home in the suburban New York village of Belle Terre for
a period of eighteen months. Both the owners of the home and the
college students were found in violation of local zoning ordinances
and were served with an "Order to Remedy Violations."' 7 The
Belle Terre case was the first Supreme Court review of an ordinance that regulates the persons who may occupy a home rather
than housing density, physical structure, or safety. The opinion by
Justice Douglas began with a broad reaffirmation of the deference
traditionally afforded local zoning regulations.' 8 Indeed, Justice
Douglas discussed only two instances in which zoning regulations
were deemed unconstitutional: when based solely on race, and
when placed on philanthropic homes so as to subject such homes to
12. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Euclid involved a challenge to local zoning ordinances
on the basis that restricted-use ordinances had diminished the value of the landowner's property and therefore constituted a taking of liberty and property without
due process within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. The Court in Euclid
concluded with an oft-quoted phrase: "If the validity of the legislative classification
for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative judgement must be allowed to
control." Id. at 388 (citation omitted).
13. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 4 (1974) (construing Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387-88 (1926)).
14. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
15. Id. at 2-3.
16. Id. at 2 (quoting BELLE TERRE, N.Y. BUILDING ZONE ORDINANCE art. I,
§ D-1.359 (1970)) (emphasis added).
17. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 3 (1974).
18. See id. at 4-5.
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the caprice of the owners of adjacent land.' 9 In his terse opinion,
Justice Douglas dismissed appellees' allegations of infringement of
their fundamental rights to privacy, association, and travel. The ordinance, Justice Douglas succinctly declared, "involves no 'fundamental' right guaranteed by the Constitution, such as voting, the
right of association, the right of access to the courts, or any rights
20
of privacy."
The Court instead viewed the Belle Terre ordinance as "economic and social legislation where legislatures have historically
drawn lines which we respect against the charge of violation of the
Equal Protection Clause if the law be 'reasonable, not arbitrary'
and bears 'a rational relationship to a [permissible] state objective.' -21 Applying this rational relationship test, Justice Douglas
found the Belle Terre objectives of securing "family values, youth
values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air" 2 2 sufficient to uphold the ordinance. Justice Marshall, the sole dissenter
on the merits, 2 3 argued that the Belle Terre ordinance significantly
burdened the fundamental rights of privacy and association guaranteed by the first and fourteenth amendments and that strict
scrutiny analysis should therefore have been applied. 24 In upholding the students' right of domestic association, Justice Marshall
stressed the close interplay between freedom of association and the
right to privacy. In his view, the choice of household companions,
"family, friends, professional associates, or others" 2 5 falls within the
ambit of these constitutional protections.
The Court's tacit approval of zoning intrusion into "family" relationships is perplexing in light of United States Department of
Agriculture v. Moreno,2 6 decided during the term preceding Belle
Terre. In Moreno the Court found the 1971 amendment of section
3(e) of the federal Food Stamp Act 2 7 unconstitutional in its denial
19. Id. at 6-7.
20. Id. at 7 (citations omitted).
21. Id. at 8 (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920),
and Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971)).
22. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974).
23. Justice Brennan believed that no case or controversy existed for the Court
to resolve. See id. at 10 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 13 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 16 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
26. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
27. Act of Jan. 11, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-671, § 2(a), 84 Stat. 2048 (amending 7
U.S.C. § 2012(e) (1964)). The 1971 amendment to § 3(e) of the Food Stamp Act of
1964 states:
The term 'household' shall mean a group of related individuals (includ-
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of food assistance to any household containing an individual unrelated to any other member of the household. In a decision by Justice Brennan, the Court declared legislative distinctions between
related and unrelated households to be "wholly without any rational basis." 28 Government arguments based on abuse of federal
food stamp assistance by college students and by other groups who
had joined solely to obtain federal assistance2 9 were deemed inadequate to support such a classification. 30 Yet, the following term
in Belle Terre the goals of "quiet seclusion," "clean air," "family
values," and "youth values" were deemed sufficient under the
same rational relationship standard to support a legislative distinction between related and unrelated persons. 3 1 While Belle Terre
and Moreno differ in the nature of the restrictions involved, the
basic rights at issue are the same.
Justice Douglas, in analysis notably absent from Belle Terre,
wrote a strong concurrence in the Moreno decision, citing NAACP
v. Alabama32 in support of "closest scrutiny" of the unrelated person provision: 3 3 In Moreno Justice Douglas stated: "The 'unrelated'
person provision of the present Act has an impact on the rights of
people to associate for lawful purposes with whom they choose.
When state action 'may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to

ing legally adopted children and legally assigned foster children) or non-

related individuals over age 60 who are not residents of an institution or
boarding house, but are living as one economic unit sharing common cooking facilities and for whom food is customarily purchased in common. The
term 'household' shall also mean (1) a single individual living alone who has
cooking facilities and who purchases and prepares food for home consumption, or (2) an elderly person who meets the requirements of section 10(h) of
this Act.
Id.

28. United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 538 (1973).
Moreno found the 1971 amendment to the federal Food Stamp Act unconstitutional
becuase it violated the equal protection clause of the fifth amendment. The fifth
amendment, although not containing a specific equal protection clause, holds federal
classifications to the same standard applied to state classifications under the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 641-42 (1969); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498-99 (1954).
29. Brief for the Appellant at 14-17, United States Dep't of Agriculture v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
30. Section 3(e) of the Food Stamp Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2012(e) (1970), bases eligibility for federal food stamp assistance on household rather than on individual income.
31. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974).
32. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
33. See United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 541 (1973)
(Douglas, J., concurring) (citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)).
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associate' it 'is subject to the closest scrutiny.' "34 However, citing
the same case, NAACP v. Alabama,3 5 in Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas,3 6 Justice Douglas reached a contrary conclusion, stating
summarily that ordinance restrictions on unrelated individuals involves "no 'fundamental' right guaranteed by the Constitution, such
as . . . the right of association."-3 7 Justice Douglas, who cited case
after case in support of his determination of government infringement of the fundamental right to freedom of association in
Moreno, 38 found the same related/unrelated classification valid in
Belle Terre. 39 Even more perplexing is Douglas' clarification: "The
[Belle Terre] ordinance places no ban on other forms of association,
for a 'family' may, so far as the ordinance is concerned, entertain
whomever it likes." 40 It is questionable whether restriction of one
form of association may be rendered constitutionally permissible
simply because another form of association is still permitted. If the
constitutional right to freedom of association is of any cognizable
dimension, its parameters must extend beyond the right to entertain whomever one pleases. The right of association should include
the choice of one's daily companions.
In a single-sentence footnote to the Belle Terre decision, Justice Douglas dismissed any apparent contradiction between Moreno
and Belle Terre. Justice Douglas declared Moreno "inapt,"4 1 reasoning that the Belle Terre definition of "family" would allow the
cohabitation of two unmarried people, whereas under Moreno the
same two unmarried people could not get food stamps. Itis difficult to reconcile the two Douglas positions. The Court in Moreno
declared that legislative distinction between a household of two related members and a household of two unrelated members is unconstitutional and "wholly without any rational basis." 4 2 Legislative
distinction between a household of three related members and a
household of three unrelated members, however, is, under Belle
Terre's rationale, "a permissible goal." 43 Regulation of the number
34.

United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 544-45 (1973)

(Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958)).
35.

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

357 U.S. 449 (1958).
416 U.S. 1, 7 (1974) (citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)).

Id. at 7 (citations omitted).
See United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 542 (1973).
See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1,7 (1974).
Id. at 9.
Id. at 8 n.6.
United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 538 (1973).
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974).
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of persons in a household is not at issue; neither scheme directly
limits the number of persons in a household. Rather, the focus of
analysis must be the rationality of the related/unrelated distinction.
Equally difficult to reconcile, given the state interest in
"peaceful bliss" proffered in Belle Terre compared with the state
interest in elimination of fraudulent federal aid claims in Moreno, is
the Court's declaration of a rational relationship to legitimate governmental interests in Belle Terre, and its opposite determination
the previous term in Moreno. Quiet spaces constituted a legitimate
governmental interest in Belle Terre, whereas the strong governmental interest in protection of limited aid funds carried little
weight in Moreno.
Belle Terre added little to substantive constitutional argumentation; yet it seemed clear in its zoning implications. Following
Belle Terre, the deference afforded zoning classifications as established in the earlier case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co. 4 4 seemed all but absolute. 4 5 The Belle Terre opinion, without

much precedent, had sustained a broad grant of power for local
zoning authorities, a situation relatively undisturbed until 197646
when the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction to hear
47
Moore v. City of East Cleveland.
THE Moore CASE

In Moore the Supreme Court addressed for the second time
the constitutional issue of zoning restriction of the "family." East
Cleveland municipal zoning ordinances limited occupancy of dwelling units to members of a single family. "Family," as defined by
the ordinance, included only a few categories of related individuals. 48 Moore involved a 63-year-old woman living with her son and

two grandsons. Since Mrs. Moore's two grandsons were cousins
rather than brothers, the living arrangement violated East Cleve44.
45.

272 U.S. 365 (1926).
Justice Douglas, in the Belle Terre opinion, discussed only two instances in

which zoning regulations violated the fourteenth amendment: zoning classifications

based solely on race, and zoning restrictions requiring consent of two-thirds of
neighboring homes for construction of an old age home or orphanage. See Village of
Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1974).
46. In his concurrence in Moore, Justice Stevens noted numerous state court
decisions which, despite Belle Terre, upheld the right of unrelated persons to reside
together. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 97 S. Ct. 1932, 1945 & nn.8-10, 1946
& nn.11-14 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring).
47. 425 U.S. 949 (1976).
48. See note 2 supra.
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land zoning ordinance restrictions. The Supreme Court, reversing
both the trial court and the Court of Appeals of Ohio,4 9 declared
East Cleveland's ordinance in violation of the due process clause50
of the fourteenth amendment. 5 1 The six disparate opinions written
by the Court sparked further attention to the case. Justice Powell
wrote the majority opinion in which Justices Brennan, Marshall,
and Blackmun concurred. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, wrote a separate concurrence emphasizing the disproportionate effect upon minority groups of zoning limitations on family
patterns. 52 Justice Stevens, in yet another concurring opinion,
stated that East Cleveland's ordinance constituted a taking of property without due process of law or just compensation. 53
The dissenting justices in Moore were equally divided. Chief
Justice Burger dissented on the grounds that since an administrative remedy, a local zoning variance, was available, the Supreme
Court need not face the constitutional issue presented until the
54
claimant had exhausted such remedy.
Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented largely
on the basis that Belle Terre should be controlling and that East
Cleveland's ordinance bore a rational relationship to the same
legitimate governmental purposes identified in Belle Terre: quiet
seclusion, clean air, family values, and youth values. 55
In a separate dissent, Justice White stated that the doctrine of
substantive due process, though not "illegitimate" nor "unacceptable," 56 need be approached cautiously lest its use "lead to judges
'roaming at large in the constitutional field.' "57 The extension of
49.

See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 97 S. Ct. 1932, 1934-35 (1977). The

Ohio Supreme Court denied review for lack of a substantial constitutional question.
50. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
51. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1939 (1977).
52. See id. at 1940-41 (Brennan, J., concurring).
53. See id. at 1947 (Stevens, J., concurring).
54. See id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
55. See id. at 1956 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 1959 (White, J., dissenting).
57. Id. (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
502 (1965)). Justice White believed that the experiences of the Lochner era, during
which judicial intervention increased substantially, had led to substantial reinterpretations of the Constitution. See id. at 1958 (White, J., dissenting). The Lochner era is
a term generally used to describe the period beginning with the 1905 Supreme Court
decision in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and extending into the mid1930's. During that period, nearly 200 regulations were invalidated by the Court on
substantive due process grounds. Widespread judicial intervention in economic regulation has become the characteristic most often associated with the Lochner era. Typically, the Lochner era decisions also contained strongly-worded dissents, often by
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substantive due process to the facts in Moore, Justice White asserted, "suggests a far too expansive charter for this Court."5 8 Justice White concluded that no due process rights were implicated
by the facts in issue and that the East Cleveland ordinance should
be sustained on the basis of the standard applied in McGowan v.
Maryland:59 " 'A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any
state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.' "60
Justice Powell, writing for the Court in Moore, recognized a
substantive due process "family" right. It began with a declaration
that neither Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas61 nor Village of Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Co. 62 was controlling where "a city undertakes such
intrusive regulation of the family." 63 Citing more than a dozen judicial decisions 6 4 in support of its conclusion, Justice Powell stated:
'This Court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice
in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' A host of cases . . . have consistently acknowledged a

'private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.'6 5

After the Court reviewed its function under the due process
clause, 66 it expanded the recognition of a substantive due process
Justice Holmes. See generally C. GUNTHER, The Discredited Period of Judicial Intervention: What Was Wrong with Lochner?, in CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 564 (9th ed. 1975). Justice White cites several Lochner era dissenting opinions in his criticism of the Court's use of substantive due process in the
Moore decision. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1957-58 (1977)
(White, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 1961 (White, J., dissenting).
59. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
60. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 97 S. Ct. 1932, 1962 (1977) (White, J.,
dissenting) (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961)).
61. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
62. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
63. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1935 (1977).
64. See id. at 1935-36 (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632,
639-40 (1974); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 231-33 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Ginsberg v.
New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 121 (1967);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); id. at 495-96 (Goldberg, J., concurring); id. at 502-03 (White, J., concurring); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-44,
549-53 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953);
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535, 541 (1942); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-401 (1923)).
65. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 97 S. Ct. 1932, 1935-36 (1977) (quoting
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974)) (citations omitted).
66. '[T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause
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right with regard to the "private realm of family life," 67 stating that

the protection of family rights cannot be cut off "at the first convenient, if arbitrary boundary-the boundary of the nuclear family." 68
Although Moore concluded by stating that "the Constitution prevents East Cleveland from standardizing its children-and its
adults-by forcing all to live in certain narrowly defined family patterns," 69 the Court explicitly discussed only the extended related
family. The Court did not have to reach the difficult issue of protection for the extended family, that is, whether the related/
unrelated distinction could also constitute a convenient, if arbitrary, boundary. Indeed, the Court began by distinguishing Belle
Terre as involving unrelated persons, whereas Moore involved only
related individuals. 70 The Court in Moore, like the many state
courts which found reasons to distinguish Belle Terre from the decisions they rendered, 71 did not wish to be bound by Belle Terre's
rationale or to consider the more troublesome constitutional issue
of the rights of unrelated individuals. The Court did, however, for
the first time in its history, invalidate a zoning ordinance premised
upon a substantive due process recognition of at least a limited
"family" right. Interestingly, the cases cited by the Court in support
cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of the specific guarantees
elsewhere provided in the Constitution . . . . [This liberty] is a rational
continuum which, boradly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial
and which also recogarbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints ....
nizes, what a reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that certain interests
require particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their
abridgement.'
Id. at 1937 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-43 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
67. Id. at 1936 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
68. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 97 S. Ct. 1932, 1937 (1977).
69. Id. at 1939.
70. See id. at 1935. If the substantive due process rights conferred on the family
by Moore extend to "families" with unrelated members, it could be argued persuasively that the Belle Terre ordinance would be unconstitutional under Moore.
71. Justice Stevens cited several state court decisions which had avoided Belle
Terre and permitted unrelated persons to occupy single-family residences. See id. at
1945 & nn.8-10, 1946 & nn.11-15 (Stevens, J., concurring). These decisions were:
Women's Kansas City St. Andrew Soc'y v. Kansas City, 58 F.2d 593 (8th Cir. 1932);
Village of Univ. Heights v. Cleveland Jewish Orphans' Home, 20 F.2d 743 (6th Cir.
1927); Brady v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 2d 69, 19 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1962); Carroll
v. City of Miami Beach, 198 So. 2d 643 (Fla. App. 1967); City of Des Plaines v.
Trottner, 34 Ill. 2d 432, 216 N.E.2d 116 (1966); Robertson v. Western Baptist Hosp.,
267 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. App. 1954); Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59
N.J. 241, 281 A.2d 513 (1971); City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300, 313
N.E.2d 756, 357 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1974); Missionaries of Our Lady of LaSalette v. Village of Whitefish Bay, 267 Wis. 609, 66 N.W.2d 627 (1954).
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of this "family" right included not only cases supporting marriage or the rights of the traditional family, 72 but also cases involving the rights of the unwed, illegitimate, and otherwise nontraditional family. 73 Still, the Court did not stray very wide of its mark.
It is notable that the Court excluded from its analysis Eisenstadt v.
Baird74 which had extended the marital right of privacy, recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut,75 to the individual. The Court in
Eisenstadt stated: "[If the right of privacy means anything, it is the
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affect76
ing a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."
The Eisenstadt decision, emphasizing the rights of an individual,
regardless of his status or relationship to another individual, was
clearly beyond the Court's desired scope in Moore.
The Stevens concurrence dealt with the many questions left
unanswered by the Court in Moore. Justice Stevens based his concurrence upon the determination that East Cleveland's ordinance
"constitutes a taking of property without due process and without
just compensation.- 7 7 He noted that the facts in Moore represented
an unprecedented restriction on an owner's use of his property.
The concurring Justice asserted: "There appears to be no precedent
for an ordinance which excludes any of an owner's relatives from
the group of persons who may occupy his residence on a permanent basis."7 8 Justice Stevens then cited decisions by state courts
which had invalidated ordinances restricting the right of unrelated
individuals to reside together: 7 9 "[I]n well reasoned opinions, the
courts of Illinois, New York, New Jersey, California, Connecticut,
Wisconsin, and other jurisdictions, have permitted unrelated persons to occupy single-family residences notwithstanding an ordinance prohibiting, either expressly or implicitly, such occupancy." 80
72. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (upholding right of
married persons to obtain contraceptive devices).
73. See Roe v. NWade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right of unwed woman to obtain
abortion); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (right of unwed father to custody of
illegitimate child upon death of mother).
74. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
75. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
76. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
77. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 97 S. Ct. 1932, 1947 (1977) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
78. Id. at 1946 (Stevens, J.,concurring).
79. See note 71 supra.
80. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 97 S. Ct. 1932, 1945-46 (1977) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (footnotes omitted).
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Justice Stevens noted that zoning ordinances regulating the identity
rather than the number of persons who may occupy a household
have been upheld by state courts "only to the extent that the ordinances require such households to remain nontransient, singlehousekeeping units." 8 1 In a footnote, Justice Stevens declared that
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas8 2 was consistent with this line of
state authority. 8 3 Justice Stevens agreed with a state court's8 4
characterization of the Belle Terre ordinance as aimed primarily at
the prevention of transiency. Justice Stevens declared that in Belle
Terre, where college students shared in temporary living arrangements, "[t]here would be none of the permanency of community
that characterizes a residential neighborhood of private homes." 85
Whether the Stevens opinion indicates a changing attitude in
the Court or merely is one more device to be used by state courts
in eliding the Belle Terre decision, the split in the Court in Moore
may signal an expansion of Belle Terre's restricted view of "family"
rights.
Belle Terre-Moore: THE FUTURE
Moore v. City of East Cleveland 6 established Supreme Court
recognition of a substantive due process right for the "family."
Moore, however, extended the parameters of the family no further
than necessary for its holding. It prohibited, in particular, an ordinance which "makes a crime of a grandmother's choice to live with
her grandson in circumstances like those presented here."8 7 Nevertheless, Moore is not without import. Substantive due process, out
of fashion for much of this century, 8 has reappeared and invaded
81. Id. at 1946 (footnote omitted). Single-housekeeping units are distinguished
from boarding homes or fraternity houses in that the individuals therein live together
as one economic unit, share common cooking facilities, and purchase food jointly.
See, e.g., United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 530 (1973).
82. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
83. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 97 S. Ct. 1932, 1946 n.15 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring).
84. City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300, 313 N.E.2d 756, 357 N.Y.S.
2d 449 (1974).
85. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 97 S. Ct. 1932, 1946 n.15 (quoting City of
White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300, 304-05, 313 N.E.2d 756, 758, 357 N.Y.S.2d
449, 452 (1974)). It is interesting to note that Justice Douglas had rejected this interpretation in Belle Terre. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7 (1974).
86. 97 S. Ct. 1932 (1977).
87. Id. at 1935.
88. See id. at 1937 & n.9. See also note 37 supra and accompanying text. Justice
White's dissent in Moore also recalled the so-called Lochner era which rendered
due process rights suspect. See id. at 1957-58 (White, J., dissenting); note 57 supra.
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the traditionally immune area of zoning regulations.8 9 Although
recognition of substantive due process rights in the "family" does
not automatically imply freedom from all government regulation,
any more than does freedom of speech imply license to yell "fire,"
the Court in Moore has moved perceptibly away from the earlier
Belle Terre standard which had upheld such regulation.
The term "family" as defined in the Belle Terre ordinance
raises an unusual paradox, particularly in light of the Moore decision. The ordinance defined "family" to include one or more persons related by blood, adoption, or marriage, or not more than two
unrelated persons, living and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit. 90 Explicit in Belle Terre's definition is recognition
that a family may consist totally of unrelated persons. Moore did
not decide whether the family can consist of unrelated members
when it extended substantive due process rights to the family.
Belle Terre implicitly recognized that biological and marital ties
cannot constitute the sole criteria for determining family status.
To distinguish between families purely on the basis of blood relationships or contractual agreement within the group is irrational.
To limit the unrelated family to two persons is also unnecessary.
Local ordinances which are designed to limit noise, sanitary problems, or unsightly areas will effectively restrain the unrelated
household, as well as the related household. Traffic congestion and
overcrowding, legitimate zoning concerns, are better served by
other ordinances and are only marginally served by Belle Terre's
restriction. Traffic congestion can be reduced by prohibition of onstreet parking. Overcrowding can best be avoided by limiting the
number of occupants in a household directly, either in terms of
absolute number or in relation to available floor space. Indeed,
East Cleveland had such a density control ordinance in effect which
"establishe[d] occupancy limits based upon logical criteria, namely
the amount of living space in square foot terms available to each
89. See generally Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionarj Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REv. 767 (1969).
The Supreme Court abandoned the supervision of zoning four decades ago.
In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. the Justices broadly sanctioned
comprehensive zoning, declaring it immune to constitutional attack unless
the conclusion could be reached that a given ordinance is "clearly arbitrary
and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety,

morals, or general welfare."
Id. at 783 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365, 395 (1926)).
90. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 2 (1974).
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inhabitant." 91 As Justice Stevens noted in his concurrence to the
Moore decision, "[tlo attack these problems [of overcrowding and
congestion] through use of a restrictive definition of family is, as one
court noted, like 'burn[ing] the house to roast the pig.' "92
In view of Justice Brennan's emphasis in his concurrence in
Moore on the disproportionate effect on blacks and the indigent of
limiting household composition, and in view of our country's efforts
to conserve resources, Belle Terre may be economically as well as
socially unsound.
The Belle Terre evaluation of the parameters of the right to
freedom of association is perplexing at best. It is difficult to conceive of a right to freedom of association limited to related persons
alone; indeed, in its most traditional sense, this right has envisioned the joining of strangers or unrelated persons. Further, if
first amendment association rights have traditionally recognized the
right of groups to gather publicly in meetings, 9 3 the right to gather
privately within one's home must also be protected. It is unlikely
that the first amendment ever will be interpreted to permit the restriction of lawful assembly to two people.
The most crucial issue, however, lies in the constitutional implications of Moore. Moore recognizes a substantive due process
right extending beyond the nuclear family, including, at least, the
extended related family. But a constitutional right, if it is of any
import, should not only protect the popular or traditional view. A
constitutional right can hardly be deemed a constitutional right if it
represents merely affirmation of, or worse, coercion into, fixed or
uniform patterns.
Regulating family membership involves overseeing the most
personal and intimate aspects of an individual's life. This area stands
on the outer limits of a state's ability to regulate. The Moore decision,
reflecting this type of concern, can and should mark the advance of
the Supreme Court toward full recognition of a personal lifestyle
right.
Kathe J. Tyrrell
91. Brief for the Appellant at 47, Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 97 S. Ct.
1932 (1977) (citing EAST CLEVELAND, OHIO MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES § 1351.03(e)

(1967)).
92. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1946 n.16 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (quoting Larson v. Mayor of Spring Lake Heights, 99 N.J. Super. 365,
374, 240 A.2d 31, 36 (Law Div. 1968)).
93. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina,
372 U.S. 229 (1963).
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